

**Closing Remarks delivered by  
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- We live in a world where the threat of nuclear terrorism is a reality. I don't have to tell this audience about the consequences of such an attack - you have already contemplated such scenarios.
- The United States believes that the surest means of reducing the threat of nuclear terrorism is to deny would-be terrorist access to the nuclear material at the target.
- Sounds simple, but in fact it remains one of our preeminent challenges. A challenge that all of you are trying to address.
- Those of you here today are the people directly responsible for nuclear material security – whether you are a nuclear material custodian, an inspector, a project manager, or an engineer working on the design of physical protection systems – you are in fact the first line of defense against nuclear terrorism.
- In 2004, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) unanimously passed Resolution 1540, creating a legally binding obligation on States to “develop and maintain ‘*appropriate effective*’ physical protection measures and measures to account for and secure nuclear materials in production, use, storage or transport.”
- Moreover, since 2006, 73 States have joined the U.S. and Russia in endorsing the Statement of Principles of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, which reinforces UNSCR 1540 and urges States to “develop, if necessary, and improve accounting, control and physical protection systems for nuclear and other radioactive materials and substances.”
- The UNSCR 1540 requirement for ‘appropriate effective’ nuclear material security is significant in that, in spite of its vagueness, it is much broader than existing convention-based requirements because it applies to all states, all materials and goes beyond physical protection to include accounting and security during material processing.
- The purpose of the workshop was to facilitate a discussion between policymakers and those responsible for implementation and oversight of nuclear material security, on the meaning of the UNSCR 1540 requirement for States to maintain ‘appropriate effective’ nuclear material security measures.

- UNSCR 1540 provides an opportunity for states to work together to define ‘appropriate effective’ nuclear security and improve upon standards for physical protection and nuclear safeguards.
- It is also an opening for the nuclear security community to pause and reflect on the effectiveness of the existing nuclear security regime and best practices.
- Do the tools exist to support ‘appropriate effective’ nuclear security? Are there gaps in our current efforts to address security vulnerabilities? Do we have a plan to address what we consider deficiencies?
- I am proud of the role that the United States and in particular NNSA has played to date, working in conjunction with our international partners, to reduce the threat of nuclear terrorism through programs aimed at consolidating, converting and securing nuclear materials.
- At NNSA, we have converted 52 reactors in 31 countries from HEU to LEU.
- We have monitored the down-blending of 327 metric tons of former Soviet weapons-origin material to LEU
- We have worked with our Russian counterparts to secure 85% of Russian nuclear weapons sites of concern and returned over 600 kgs of Russian origin HEU.
- We have led the U.S. government interagency physical protection assessment effort, leading over 150 official bilateral physical protection site visits to more than 40 countries.
- These are impressive accomplishments but, until all vulnerable materials and facilities have ‘appropriate effective’ security, they are still not enough.
- Proliferators are constantly looking for new ways to confound our nonproliferation efforts, probing for as-yet unrevealed weaknesses. We face a substantial challenge as we proactively seek to improve our defenses.
- Together we must rise to this challenge.
- Today’s discussions have both identified shortcoming and generated recommendations for the improvements of material control and accounting and physical protection.
- Today’s workshop, as a Global Initiative activity, is also in keeping with the Global Initiative partners’ aim (discussed at the June 2008 GI Meeting in Madrid) to integrate the efforts of public, private, and non-profit sectors.
- I applaud efforts to amend the Convention of Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials (CPPNM) and current efforts to revise INFCIRC/225 ‘The Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials and Facilities’.

- We have led the effort to modify and update INFCIRC/255, ensuring that States meet the objectives and the 12 Fundamental Principles codified in the amended CPPNM, thus ensuring that physical protection standards meet those demanded by the current threat environment.
- This workshop has also emphasized the importance of sharing “best practices” and learning from the physical protection successes and failures of one another. Numerous foreign officials responsible for nuclear security have participated in the physical protection training courses that we have developed, and are glad to provide follow-up assistance to those who request it.
- In addition, what I have taken from today, is that the international community has traditionally approached nuclear security with the assumption that an attack would come from an outside adversary. Little attention has been given to date on how ‘appropriate effective’ relates to reducing insider-related vulnerabilities. This is an area in need of more attention.
- I encourage a continued discussion on what constitutes ‘appropriate effective’ material control and accounting in the context of the timely detection required to reduce the threat of insider adversaries clandestinely diverting nuclear materials.
- In conclusion, on behalf of the US Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration, I would like to thank you for participating in today’s workshop on a timely topic of critical importance.
- It is imperative that we provide support to the implementation of UNSCR 1540 as well as the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism’s Statement of Principles.
- It is up to us to provide the leadership and the expertise to give meaning to the requirement for ‘appropriate effective’ nuclear security measures. We must continue to move forward to develop consensus on best security practices and work collaboratively to develop a comprehensive approach that addresses current gaps in the international regime and vulnerabilities worldwide.
- I hope to see the recommendations proposed at the closing plenary brought to fruition and closer cooperation among the 1540 Committee, Global Initiative, this workshop’s participants, as well as our team from NNSA working with our domestic and international partners.
- I wish you the best of luck in this endeavor and you can count on our continued support in improving nuclear material security worldwide.